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I. INTRODUCTION 
Welcome to the 2010 edition of the NASA Range Safety Annual Report. Funded by NASA 
Headquarters, this report provides a NASA Range Safety overview for current and potential 
range users. This report contains articles which cover a variety of subject areas, summaries of 
various NASA Range Safety Program activities conducted during the past year, links to past 
reports, and information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way 
business will be done in the future. 
Specific topics discussed in the 2010 NASA Range Safety Annual Report include a program 
overview and 2010 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range Safety Policy revision; 
Independent Assessments; Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA 
launch/flight operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies; 
and status repor!:s from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities. 
Every effort has been made to include the most current information available. We recommend 
this report be used only for guidance and that the validity and accuracy of all articles be verified 
for updates. Once again, the web-based format was used to present the annual report. We 
continually receive positive feedback on the web-based edition and hope you enjoy this year's 
product as well. 
As is the case each year, contributors to this report are too numerous to mention, but we thank 
individuals from the NASA Centers, the Department of Defense, and civilian organizations for 
their contributions. In acknowledging Range Safety personnel who contributed to our success, I 
would also like to recognize my predecessor, Mr. Rich Lamoreaux, who did an exemplary job 
while at NASA. Rich left our family this year to return closer to family roots in New Jersey via 
Picatinny Arsenal. We wish him well. 
In conclusion, it has been a very busy and productive year. I'd like to extend a personal Thank 
You to everyone who contributed to make this year a successful one, and I look forward to 
working with all of you in the upcoming year. 
Alan G. Dumont 
NASA Range Flight Safety Program Manager 
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II. RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND 2010 HIGHLIGHTS 
2010 continued the busy pace of previous years in Range Safety. Before highlighting the areas 
covered in this year's edition, it's important to restate the goal of the NASA Range Safety 
Program as defined in NPR 8715.5 Rev A, "Range Flight Safety Program," dated 19 September 
2010, and signed by the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. The goal of the program is to 
protect the public, the workforce, and property during range operations such as launching, 
flying, landing, and testing launch/flight vehicles. This goal applies to all Centers and test 
facilities and all NASA vehicle programs, including expendable launch vehicles, reusable launch 
vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, the Space Shuttle, and the Constellation Program. Also 
included in this group are NASA-funded commercial ventures that involve range operations. We 
meet the goal of NPR 8715.5 Rev A by evaluating, mitigating, and controlling the hazards 
associated with range operations such as debris, distant focusing overpressure, and toxics. 
This is our fifth year providing the annual report via a web-based format. While many articles 
are continuations of Range Safety topics discussed in previous years, we have provided articles 
on several new topics as well. New article topics include the aeronautical activities being 
considered by John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), the specific activities at our field centers, 
as well as an article from the new Range Safety Representative at Stennis Space Center (SSC), 
a position instituted in response to the need to assess hazards from new activities being 
considered at Stennis. As always, this report takes a comprehensive look at Range Safety to 
demonstrate how we meet or implement the Range Safety Program. 
During 2010, we were very busy with the development, implementation, and support of Range 
Safety policy and with the update of local agreements between KSC and the 45th Space Wing. 
After coordinating across the Agency, folding in lessons learned, and adapting to new national 
risk criteria, a new revision to NASA's Range Safety Program policy (NPR 8715.5, Revision A) 
was posted in September 2010. Despite the announcement of the cancellation of the 
Constellation Program, we continued to support tailoring activities for the Ares I vehicle while 
awaiting final authority to close out the Program. Additionally, we supported a number of Space 
Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicle launches this year and worked to update agreements 
with our partners at the Eastern and Western Ranges. 
NASA Range Safety personnel continue to support the Range Commanders Council meetings 
and have been involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety risk 
criteria. A summary of these efforts is highlighted in this report. Additionally, we continue to 
support HQ-sponsored assessments and audits of NASA Centers conducting Range Safety 
Operations, and we provide a synopsis of Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel (IAOP) Reviews 
of Ames Research Center (ARC) and Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC). 
Finally, emerging range safety technology continues to interest many in the Range Safety 
community. This year we continued to support national discussions focused on the 
development of autonomous flight safety systems concepts. 
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III. AGENCY PROGRAM 
A. Range Safety Training 2010 Updates 
The NASA Range Safety Training Program was initiated in 2004. To date, NASA Range Safety 
has conducted over 40 training courses for NASA, Department of Defense (000), Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), and contractor personnel. The course breakout and number of 
students is shown in Figure 1. 
Courses # Classes # Students 
Range Safety Orientation 22 588 
Range Flight Safety Analysis 7 127 
Range Flight Safety Systems 9 130 
Range Safety Operations 4 24 
FIGURE 1: TOTAL NUMBER OF CLASSES AND STUDENTS TAUGHT 
NASA Safety Training Center (NSTC) funding has been severely reduced for 2011. Only three 
courses are currently scheduled , as shown below. The Range Safety Office will take this 
opportunity to revamp the analysis course and to transfer instruction of the operations course to 
Wallops Flight Facility personnel. 
Course Date Location 
Range Safety Orientation 
Range Safety Orientation 
Range Flight Safety Systems 
Range Flight Safety Analysis 
Ran e Fli ht Safet 0 erations 
25-26 Apr 2011 
13-14 Jul2011 
2-4 Aug 2011 
None Scheduled 
None Scheduled 
FIGURE 2: 2011 COURSE SCHEDULE 
1. Range Safety Orientation (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0074) 
KSC 
SSC 
KSC 
The Range Safety Orientation Course is designed to provide an understanding of the Range 
Safety mission, associated policies and requirements, and NASA roles and responsibilities. It 
introduces the students to the major ranges and their capabilities, defines and discusses the 
major elements of Range Safety (flight analysis, flight safety systems, and range operations) , 
and briefly addresses associated range safety topics such as ground safety, frequency 
management, and unmanned aerial systems (UASs) . The course emphasizes the principles of 
safety risk management to ensure the public and NASA/range workforces are not subjected to 
risk of injury greater than that of normal day-to-day activities. 
The Range Safety Orientation Course is designed to inform the audience of the services offered 
by the Range Safety organization, present timeframes that allow adequate interface with Range 
Safety during Program/Project startup and design in an effort to minimize potential delays and 
costs, and recommend ways of making the working relationship with Range Safety the most 
beneficial for the Range User. This course includes a visit to Range Safety facilities at Cape 
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Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS)/KSC when normally presented at the Eastern Range. If 
you wish to discuss presenting the class at your location, please contact the NSTC staff. 
Target Audience: 
• Senior, program, and project managers 
• Safety, Reliability, Quality, and Maintainability professionals with an interest in range safety 
activities 
Rang~~ Safety Orientation 
Day 1 
• Intro & Range Safety Missions 
• Range Safety Orga nization 
• Policies, Standards, Directives 
• launch & Test Facilities 
• Flight Analysis 
• Flight Termination Systems 
• Tracking & Telemetry 
• Range Safety Operations 
Day 2 
• Ground Safety 
• Frequency M anagement 
• UAC Operations 
• The Way Ahead 
• Hangar AE Tour 
• Morrell Operations Center 
Tour 
• Summary 
• Critiques 
FIGURE 3: RANGE SAFETY ORIENTATION COURSE OUTLINE 
In addition to the two NSTC-sponsored Range Safety Orientation courses in 2010, a specially 
tailored one-day orientation course was presented to the new Constellation Space 
Transportation Planning Office (CSTPO) at KSC in June 2010. The course was tailored and 
presented by the NASA Range Safety Office and not sponsored by NSTC. 
2. Range Flight Safety Analysis (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0086) 
The Range Flight Safety Analysis course was not taught in 2010, and the NASA Range Safety 
Office is using this down time to develop a new NASA-centric course. The new course is being 
designed to give the student a detailed understanding of range safety analysis but will focus 
more on NASA processes rather than Air Force processes and on risk management rather than 
containment. The current course, which will remain a standalone course for 000 and FAA 
customers, includes NASA, FAA, and 000 requirements for flight safety analysis; a discussion 
of range operation hazards, risk criteria, and risk management processes; and an in-depth 
coverage of the containment and risk management analyses performed for expendable launch 
vehicles (ELVs) at the Eastern Range. 
The new course (outline still TBD) will include other vehicles [Reusable Launch Vehicles 
(RLVs), UASs, balloons, etc.] and other NASA ranges. The course will still concentrate on 
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debris hazards and analyses and will include an overview of toxic, blast, and radiation risks and 
analyses. Class exercises will cover many aspects of the flight analysis process. 
Prerequisite: Completion of NSTC Course 074, "Range Safety Orientation," or equivalent 
experience. 
Target Audience: 
• NASA, FAA, and DoD Range Safety Analysts 
• Range safety personnel in other disciplines 
• Program/project managers and engineers who design potentially hazardous systems to 
operate on a range 
Course Overview 
Module 1 
• Historical 
Background 
• What is Flight 
Safety Analysis? 
• Why do we do 
FS Analysis? 
• What do FS 
Analysts do? 
Range Flight Safety Analysis 
RequIrements 
Module 2 
• Policies, 
Regulations, and 
Requirements 
• Roles and 
Responsibilities 
• Documentation 
and Data 
Requirements 
Risk Management 
Module 3 
• Risk Principles 
• Risk 
Contributors 
• Risk Mitigation 
• Risk Acceptance 
AnalysIs 
Module 4 
• Program Intra 
• Preliminary 
Flight Plan 
Approval 
• RS Criteria 
Generation 
• Hazardous Areas 
• Final FPA 
• Launch Day & 
Post Launch 
Support 
Other Hazards 
Module 5 
• Taxies 
• Distant Focused 
Overpressure 
• Radiation 
FIGURE 4: CURRENT RANGE FLIGHT SAFETY ANALYSIS COURSE OUTLINE 
3. Range Flight Safety Systems (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0096) 
The Flight Safety Systems (FSS) Course describes FSS responsibilities and Flight Termination 
System (FTS) design, test, performance, implementation, analysis, and documentation 
requirements. The course also includes a review of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flight 
termination systems, balloon universal termination packages, and the Enhanced Flight 
Termination System (EFTS). The FSS class concludes with a description of the Autonomous 
Flight Safety System (AFSS) and a tour of the Naval Ordnance Test Unit (NOTU) facilities when 
the class is held at Kennedy Space Center. 
Prerequisites: 
1. Completion of NSTC 074, "Range Safety Orientation ," or equivalent level of experience or 
training, is required 
2. Completion of NSTC 002, "System Safety Fundamentals," or NSTC 008, "System Safety 
Workshop," is recommended 
Target Audience: 
• NASA, FAA, and DoD Range Safety Personnel working Flight Safety Systems issues 
• Range safety personnel in other disciplines 
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• Program/project managers and engineers who design potentially hazardous systems to 
operate on a range 
• Personnel who conduct hazardous operations on a range 
Range Flight Safety Systems 
FIGURE 5: RANGE FLIGHT SAFETY SYSTEMS COURSE OUTLINE 
4. Range Safety Operations Course (SMA-SAFE-NSTC-0097) 
To ensure mission success and safe operations for the Range, a formal process has evolved 
within the Range community to provide range safety operations. This course addresses the 
roles and responsibilities of the Range Safety Officer (RSO) for range safety operations as well 
as real-time support, including pre-launch, launch, flight, re-entry, landing, and any associated 
mitigation. Mission rules, countdown activities, and display techniques are presented. 
Additionally, tracking , telemetry, and vehicle characteristics are covered in detail. Finally, post 
operations, lessons learned, and the use and importance of contingency plans are presented. 
Students receive hands-on training and exercises to reinforce the instruction. 
This course is only presented at WFF (Wallops Flight Facility) and is limited to six participants. 
To reduce cost and increase course availability, WFF personnel will instruct this course 
beginning in 2011. NASA Range Safety will still review and control the course content to ensure 
its applicability across all Centers. 
Prerequisites: 
1. Completion of NSTC course 074, "Range Safety Orientation," or equivalent experience 
and/or training , and a background in range safety. 
2. Completion of NSTC course 0086, "Range Flight Safety Analysis," or equivalent experience 
and/or training . 
3. Completion of NSTC course 0096, "Flight Safety Systems," or equivalent experience and/or 
training 
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Target audience: Persons identified as needing initial training for future/current job as RSO with 
NASA or RSO management. 
Range Safety Operations 
--... 
FIGURE 6: RANGE SAFETY OPERATIONS COURSE OUTLINE 
If you wish to attend any of the courses offered, please contact your Center training manager, or 
refer to the NSTC web site course catalogue located at: https://satern.nasa.gov/elms/learner/ 
catalog/ 
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B. Range Safety Policy 
1. NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8715.5A 
The latest revision of NPR 8715.5, "Range Flight Safety Program," was posted during this year. 
The document had not been updated since July 2005 and was due to be reviewed with an eye 
toward incorporating lessons learned, further clarifying the waiver process, and adopting 
emerging trends seen in the national range safety community. 
In addition to numerous administrative changes and the incorporation of a better-defined 
tailoring and waiver process in the new revision, there are a few areas which deserve to be 
highlighted. 
• Revision A adopts the new Range Commanders Council (RCC) risk aggregation criteria 
found in RCC 321-10, "Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges." In the previous 
NPR, each hazard had its own risk criteria. This meant that for debris, toxics, and blast 
overpressure hazards, a mission had to meet collective public risk criteria equal to or less 
than thirty-in-a-million for each hazard being analyzed. The new criteria combines the 
hazards and has been set to less than or equal to one hundred-in-a-million. 
• The satellite collision avoidance methodology section was expanded to allow for classical 
spherical miss distance, ellipsoidal criteria, as well as utilizing hit probability. 
• The need was identified for the NASA Range Safety Manager to support not only 
Infrastructure, Facilities, and Operations Audits conducted by HQ, but also Inter-Center 
Aircraft Operations Panel reviews for aeronautical activities which have range safety 
ramifications. 
• High-level Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) policy for NASA was provided. The 
policy details the need to design and qualify to standards approved by the cognizant Center 
range safety organization or the NASA Range Flight Safety Manager. When used on 
vehicles which will contain human inhabitants, the AFSS must also meet human rating fault 
tolerance requirements for catastrophic events. 
2. Launch Support Policy 
2010 was a very busy year for updating launch support policy and agreements. In addition to 
the NPR 8715.5 update mentioned above, KCA-1305, "KSC/45 SW/SSP Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) for Range Safety," and KCA-1308, "KSC/45 SW Joint Operating Procedure 
(JOP) for Safety," were scheduled for triennial review. These documents define range safety 
processes associated with launch vehicle/payload processing and launch and/or recovery of 
launch vehicles, missiles, and unmanned aircraft missions that involve joint operations between 
Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and/or Patrick Air Force Base. 
For the MOA, NASA Range Safety (NRS) coordinated the review between NASA, the 45th 
Space Wing, and the Space Shuttle Program Office. During the review process, all parties 
jointly determined the applicability of each piece of the agreement and made updates and/or 
deletions as needed. 
The review team added a requirement for NASA EL V missions to notify NASA Range Safety of 
any flight safety waiver request that involves airborne or ground flight termination or tracking 
systems, significant increase in KSC risk, or exceedance of acceptable risk criteria as outlined 
in the applicable range safety requirements documents. 
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For non-NASA launches it was agreed that the 45th Space Wing (45 SW) will retain 
responsibility for the protection of the public. However, KSC is the final decision authority 
regarding the coordinated approaches used to mitigate risk on KSC. 
The revised MOA, KCA-1305, Rev 0, was approved and signed on 14 September 2010 and has 
been released in TechDocs. 
To view the MOA KCA 1305, Rev D. click here 
For the JOP, KCA 1308, NASA Range Safety again worked with the 45 SW to perform a line by 
line review of content. Most of the changes were administrative in nature. The usual round of 
capturing organizational changes and updates to referenced documents were done. As there 
was an effort to coordinate and sign an MOA between the Launch Services Program (LSP) and 
the 45 SW during the same timeframe, a note was added to the JOP to ensure that agreements 
between LSP and 45 SW were not in conflict. The JOP is in coordination as of this writing. 
3. Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group (RSG) 
The Range Commanders Council (RCC) was founded in 1951 to provide a way for 000 test 
ranges to communicate and discuss common problems. 
The RCC Range Safety Group (RSG) continues to provide a forum in which ranges can 
standardize, develop, and improve on a variety of subjects and processes related to range 
safety. NASA participates in this forum on a regular basis and became an official voting 
member in 2008. Range Safety representatives from NASA HQ, KSC, Dryden Flight Research 
Center (DFRC) , and Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) actively support the RSG and its 
subcommittees on a regular basis. DFRC is currently the Flight Termination Systems 
Committee Chair while WFF is scheduled to become the RSG Chair in 2011 and lead the entire 
RSG. Two RSG meetings were held during 2010, as summarized below. 
a. 10sth Range Safety Group Conference 
The 106th Range Safety Group Conference was hosted by Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) on 4-6 
May 2010. The RSG main committee, Risk Committee, and Flight Termination Systems 
Committee (FTSC) participated in the conference. 
In the main committee, the host range (ATC) presented an orientation briefing regarding 
operations occurring at ATC, and Failure Analysis, Inc. gave a presentation on prognostic 
analysis used to measure equipment reliability and its potential benefit to range safety. 
In the Risk Committee, representatives of the NASA Range Safety Program reviewed and 
agreed with changes to risk standards contained in RCC 321-10, "Common Risk Criteria for 
National Test Ranges," the basic document that defines consensus standards for the range risk 
management process and risk criteria. NASA's participation included representatives from 
WFF, DFRC, KSC, and NASA Headquarters', Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) . 
The companion document, RCC 321-10 Supplement, provides additional detailed information to 
assist in the implementation of standards in the basic document. 
The changes to risk standards contained in RCC 321 -10 expanded the document to address the 
range safety criteria , policies, and processes to manage conditional risks, critical asset 
protection, and treatment of risk model uncertainty. The update also clarified that the 
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acceptable risk criteria is to be applied separately to launch and re-entry missions. The update 
also modified and clarified risk definitions. 
In the FTSC, DFRC gave a presentation regarding Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS) 
implementation and testing efforts occurring at DFRC/Edwards AFB (EAFB). The presentation 
included information regarding the development of the new Advanced Command Destruct 
System (ACDS), a joint EAFB/DFRC project to centralize the operations and maintenance of all 
command transmitters at EAFB. There was also discussion regarding the recertification testing 
for EFTS receivers, and ATK gave a briefing on their new developments in ordnance initiator 
systems. Additionally, several RCC documents were also discussed in the meeting including 
the Test Standard for EFTS Receivers, RCC 319 FTS Commonality Standard, and GPS 
Dynamic Simulation Testing appendix for RCC 324. 
RCC 321-10 Standard and Supplement updates were submitted to the RCC Secretariat for 
publication in July 2010. 
b. 107th Range Safety Group Conference 
The 10th Range Safety Group Conference was hosted by Nellis AFB on 19-21 October 2010. 
The RSG main committee, Risk Committee, and FTSC participated in the conference. 
In the main committee, Nellis AFB, as the host range, gave a presentation familiarizing the 
group with range operations occurring at Nellis AFB. ATK personnel then gave an update on 
their Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) development, which is currently ongoing. This 
development uses the NASA-developed AFSS software and flight rules as a baseline in their 
design. Next, NASA Wallops gave a presentation on the current status and latest flight test 
results of their AFSS. There was also a brief presentation on RCC 323 ("Range Safety Criteria 
for Unmanned Air Vehicles") and a discussion on comments and possible changes to the 
document for a future update. 
Several topics were discussed in the Risk Committee. Debris catalog and empirical database 
development were discussed along with updates on proposed RSG Risk Committee tasks: 
uncertainty, vulnerability, and RSO response time. Discussion for the remainder of the meeting 
revolved around a variety of issues including recent aircraft hazard area analysis, recent aircraft 
vulnerability test results, catastrophic risk discussion, conditional risk discussion, population and 
sheltering input data, launch and reentry benchmark guidelines, upper-stage debris risk analysis 
guidelines, reentry risk analysis guidelines, and probability of failure guidelines. At the end of 
the discussions, the risk committee developed a prioritized task list for future work in the 
committee: 
1. Aircraft Protection Criteria and Vulnerability Modeling 
2. Reusable Launch Vehicles (RL V) and Reentry Related Issues 
3. Launch and Reentry Benchmark Guidelines 
4. Debris Catalog Database 
5. Population and Sheltering Input Data Guidelines 
6. Probability of Failure Analysis Guidelines 
7. RSO Delay Time 
16 
In the FTSC, Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS) implementation at various ranges 
was discussed as was the overall path forward for several ranges planning to utilize EFTS in the 
near future. A very informative FTS battery discussion involving various ranges and range 
users took place regarding current test requirements and battery chemistries. There was also a 
discussion on pyrotechnic shock testing of components and how the testing and corresponding 
results can be improved. The items and lessons learned that will be included in the rewrite of 
RCC 319 (FTS Commonality Standard) were discussed. Discussions also occurred regarding 
the new RCC document covering testing and recertification of EFTS receivers, which is 
currently undergoing final review. 
For more background and information on the Range Commanders Council and the Range 
Safety Group, click here. 
4. Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) 
The Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) is an interagency organization that was 
formally chartered in 2004 to "establish common public safety requirements for space 
transportation at Federal and non-Federal sites." This includes the launch and reentry of 
expendable and reusable vehicles. NASA is a founding member of the CSWG, which was 
initially co-chaired by the FAA and USAF until 2010. 
This year, the CSWG revised its charter to incorporate NASA as a tri-chair and designated 
Bryan O'Connor as the NASA member of the Senior Steering Group (SSG) that provides senior 
executive leadership and guidance to the CSWG. Each agency has a designated tri-chair 
representative identified and confirmed by the SSG membership; the tri-chairs are responsible 
for executing the direction of the SSG via the various CSWG subgroups. Mike Dook is the 
designated NASA tri-chair for the CSWG. 
In 2010, achieving interagency consensus on the probability of a failure relevant to public safety 
during the maiden flights of the Falcon 9, including allocation to various flight times and vehicle 
response modes, was a major accomplishment. Estimating the failure rate profile for a new 
vehicle is a major technical challenge, and achieving interagency consensus on such a complex 
subject required substantial effort. The CSWG leveraged the resources of the three agencies 
involved to perform an in-depth analysis of the demonstrated reliability of new orbital 
expendable vehicles launched previously. Additional work is planned that will expand the scope 
of this initial assessment for the Falcon 9 to include other new vehicles developed by more 
experienced operators. 
Another significant CSWG accomplishment in 2010 was to achieve interagency consensus on 
appropriate definitions for the scope of quantitative public risk assessments preformed for 
launch and reentry. The results of this effort were also integrated into the draft updates to the 
Range Commanders Council, "Common Risk Criteria Standards for National Test Ranges" 
(RCC 321-10). 
In addition to the development and maintenance of common safety standards, the CSWG is 
also charged with coordinating the review and disposition of requests for relief from launch or 
reentry safety requirements. The CSWG's coordinated relief process enables launch operators 
to seek equivalent level of safety or waiver determinations for the requirements that are 
common to multiple agencies. Another major 2010 accomplishment was establishment of a 
Web-based, interagency non-compliance database to serve as a single central storage and 
coordination location for the CSWG. 
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Some additional historic accomplishments of the CSWG include establishment of a procedure 
for no-test ordnance shelf life extension requests, optimization of data latency considerations for 
conjunction on launch assessments, and the establishment of an interagency process for joint 
tailoring of requirements for launch and reentry. These examples demonstrate the effectiveness 
of this interagency organization in helping to establish and maintain common standards for 
safety across all ranges. 
The CSWG is currently planning several key activities for 2011 including an interagency review 
of the standards for safety critical batteries, development of common requirements for 
commercial crew and spaceflight participants, and publication of guidelines on how to develop 
and allocate failure probability estimates for new launch vehicles. 
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C. Independent Assessments 
NASA Range Safety supports NASA HQ audits and reviews on a regular basis, including 
Institutional/Facility/Operational (lFO) audits and Inter-Center Aircraft Operations Panel (IAOP) 
reviews. NASA Range Safety augmented NASA HQ IAOP team visits to Ames Research 
Center (ARC) in March 2010 and Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) in May 2010. 
The IAOP provides peer review and objective management evaluation of the procedures and 
practices being used at the operating Centers to ensure safe and efficient accomplishment of 
assigned missions and goals. The review teams also identify deficiencies in, or deviations from, 
NASA wide policies, procedures, and guidelines. The primary focus of the Range Safety team 
during IAOP reviews is on the application of range safety requirements and techniques to NASA 
operations involving Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The intersecting aviation safety and 
range safety requirements that apply to NASA UAS operations dictate the need for close 
coordination between the NASA aviation and range safety offices. To facilitate a coordinated 
review process, NASA Range Safety personnel participate in IAOP reviews at NASA Centers 
that conduct and/or host UAS operations. At this time those Centers include: ARC, DFRC, 
LaRC, and GSFCIWFF. Range safety findings during IAOP reviews and associated Center 
corrective actions are documented and tracked using IAOP systems and processes established 
by the NASA aviation office. The Range Safety team participated in the IAOPs at ARC and 
DFRC to understand each Center's Range Safety Office UAS support activities and to assess 
compliance with NPR 8715.5 requirements. 
The NASA Range Safety team developed review checklists and a NPR 8715.5 compliance 
matrix prior to arrival at Ames and DFRC. The team conducted interviews and reviewed 
documentation based on the pre-established checklists and matrix. Center Range Safety 
personnel also provided tours of a variety of different aircraft and UAS projects being supported 
by the Range Safety Office. 
In addition to general compliance with NPR 8715.5, the team concentrated on the following 
specific areas of interest: 
• Range Safety Office Input to Determining Need for FTS on Vehicles 
• Range Safety Personnel Training Documentation Process 
• Range Safety Waiver Process 
• Range Safety Risk Assessment for Small UAS Operations 
• Range Safety Officer - UAS Pilot Flight Termination Process Exercise 
• Documentation of Range Safety Risk Assessment Tool Acceptance Process 
• Range Safety Officer Training Simulator 
• Review and Approval Process for Allowing a Range Safety Officer to Perform Multiple 
Functions for a UAS Mission 
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IV. CENTER REPORTS 
A. NASA Headquarters 
The Safety and Assurance Requirements Division (SARD) at NASA Headquarters (HQ) Office 
of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) provides corporate leadership in the definition and 
implementation of NASA's Agency-wide Safety and Mission Assurance policies, procedures, 
standards, tools, techniques, and training. The HQ Range Safety Representative is located 
within SARD and provides leadership and oversight of the NASA Range Safety and EL V 
Payload Safety Programs. 
The HQ Range Safety Representative and other members of OSMA participated in many NASA 
Range Safety activities in 2010, including support to Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel 
(IAOP) Reviews at Ames Research Center (ARC) and DFRC, participation in two Range 
Commanders Council Range Safety Group (RSG) meetings, and completion of Revision A to 
NPR 8715.5, "NASA Range Flight Safety Program." The release of NPR 8715.5A completed a 
two-year effort led by the HQ Range Safety Representative. Many significant changes to NASA 
Range Safety requirements were captured in this revision (as detailed in this report in the NPR 
8715.5 revision article). 
The HQ Range Safety Representative was designated as the NASA Co-Chair to the 
USAF/FAA/NASA Common Standards Working Group (CSWG). The CSWG functions to 
implement provisions of US Space Transportation Policy directing coordination between the 
USAF, FAA, and NASA to establish common public safety requirements for space 
transportation. The CSWG's activities and products are focused on protecting the public from 
hazards associated with space launch and entry events. 
The HQ Range Safety Representative is a member of the ELV Payload Safety Agency Team. 
This past year, the Agency Team assisted a number of ELV payload projects as they work to 
successfully accomplish the NASA ELV payload safety process defined by NPR 8715.7. The 
Agency Team also worked closely with the USAF to tailor a set of payload safety requirements. 
The tailored requirements will be accepted by the USAF for use at the Eastern and Western 
Ranges and will apply to all NASA EL V payload projects. The tailored requirements are 
scheduled to be published in a new NASA Standard in 2011. 
Other activities included support to the Space Shuttle and Constellation Range Safety Panels, 
and support to research and development projects like the Joint Advanced Range Safety 
System, Autonomous Flight Safety System, Enhanced Flight Termination System, and design 
and testing of the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS). 
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B. Kennedy Space Center 
In addition to hosting the NASA Range Safety Staff, KSC has its own Center Range Safety 
team led by the KSC Range Safety Representative. The KSC Range Safety Representative is 
tasked with implementing NASA policy and keeping the NASA Range Safety Manager informed 
of all KSC activities related to range safety. Over the course of the past year, KSC Range 
Safety supported a multitude of range safety activities including Design, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation (DDT&E) support to new programs, support to Shuttle and ELV launch operations on 
both coasts, and support to emerging operations for the future. The following articles provide a 
brief summary of these activities. 
1. DDT&E Support 
a. Constellation (CxP) 
(1) Program Support 
KSC Range Safety continued to provide technical support to the Constellation Program 
throughout 2010. Most of the effort involved tailoring AFSPCMAN 91-710, "Range Safety 
Requirements," for Ares 1. Early in the year, tailoring for Volumes 1,2, and 8 was completed 
and submitted to the Program. The team also began tailoring Volume 6 and supported an initial 
tailoring meeting for Volume 4. In addition to this generic tailoring for Ares 1, the team also 
supported specific tailoring efforts for Ares Flight Test #2. These tailoring efforts helped ensure 
proper interpretation and implementation of range safety requirements while providing the 
Eastern Range and CxP with the authority and flexibility needed to accomplish the mission. 
Per NPR 8715.5, the Constellation Program submitted a draft Ares 1 Range Safety Risk 
Management Plan (RSRMP) in January 2010 describing the CxP risk management program 
and how they plan to satisfy the risk criteria in NPR 8715.5. NASA and KSC Range Safety 
reviewed this document in detail and provided comments to the Program. They also 
participated in Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP) meetings to work topics 
including GPS metric tracking requirements, range safety system destruct timing, Ares 
1-X flight closeout, FTS Launch Abort System (LAS) status, Ares 1 debris catalogue, range 
product milestones, and the LCRSP forward plan. Later in the year, KSC Range Safety started 
supporting the Constellation System Integration Panel (CxSIP) to work Flight Test 2,3, and 4 
ascent trajectory dispersion cases and FTS considerations for the LAS. Based on risk analysis, 
the Program anticipated requesting a waiver for Orion 1 to fly with no FTS on an active LAS. 
NASA and KSC Range Safety were still assessing this at year's end. 
b. 21 st Century Space Launch Complex (21 CSLC) 
The advent of the 21 st Century Space Launch Complex (21 CSLC), and in particular the Range 
Interface and Control Services Product Line, provides a unique opportunity for NASA and the 
USAF to work together to increase the flexibility, responsiveness, affordability, and capacity to 
support launches with the frequency and turnaround times necessary to meet customers' 
needs. 
KSC Range Safety provided technical support and leadership to the 21 CSLC Range Interface 
and Control Services (RICS) Product Line in 2010. KSC Range Safety and 45th Space Wing 
(45 SW) safety personnel submitted several potential 21 CSLC projects and became the 
technical co-leads for the Range Architecture Study Tools & Processes sub-team which 
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contains most of the range safety-related projects. KSC Range Safety worked closely with 45 
SW safety personnel and Space and Missile System Center (SMC) personnel in 2010 to fully 
research, justify, and plan the technical approach and acquisition strategy for these projects, in 
addition to developing an overall range architecture for the future (2011 goal). Selected projects 
will be submitted to the 21 CSLC Program Control Board in 2011 for final approval and funding. 
Some of the range safety projects submitted for consideration are highlighted below. 
(1) Population Data Server 
This project consists of the purchase and activation of a population database server for 
KSC/CCAFS. Similar to the current KSC system, it will automate the manual collection system 
used at CCAFS, provide improved risk analysis run times and submittals, and provide more 
efficient and accurate collection of base populations to be used in the 45 SW risk analysis. 
(2) Chevron and Destruct Line Automation 
This project replaces the chevron and destruct line manual AutoCAD processing with automated 
processing using the 45 SW's Safety Hazard Analysis and Risk Processing (SHARP) toolset. 
Other range processes have already been developed, certified, and replaced at the 45 SW 
using SHARP. Chevron lines enable rapid interpretation and response of an anomalous vehicle 
and provide higher fidelity in the immediate launch area where it is needed. This project could 
reduce the flight analysis mission support timeline by as much as three to five days. 
(3) Risk-Based Safe Siting Tools 
This project develops a suite of software tools for risk-based explosive safe siting and hazard 
assessment (RES). Traditional Quantity-Distance safe siting is by simple equation, based only 
on weight and type of energetic material. RES approach allows for more realistic analysis of 
fragmentation, thermal effects, acoustics, toxics, etc., and integrates with a detailed evaluation 
of hazards. The RES toolset can be used across NASA for hazardous operations analysis to 
reduce conservatism and increase flexibility. With physics-based tools, the safety staff can 
focus on protecting people and critical equipment while identifying unnecessary/costly 
mitigations. A product of one of the tools being developed by ACTA, Inc is shown in Figure 7. 
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FIGURE 7: VAS RES DEMO ACTAI"c 
(4) Joint Advanced Range Safety System (JARSS) Upgrades 
This project provides upgrades to the Joint Advanced Range Safety System (JARSS) risk tool, a 
state-of-the-art mission planning, risk analysis, and risk management tool for range safety. These 
upgrades will provide capability to support the required analysis for all horizontal take off/landing 
customers at KSC. They will also provide all necessary data to support program and KSC go/no-go 
decisions for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UA V) and Reusable Launch Vehicles (RL V) operations. 
The improved JARSS tool will greatly increase KSC marketability to horizontal takeoff and landing 
customers, and will provide full risk analysis capability and quick turnarounds for real time operational 
scenarios. For additional information, see the JARSS article in Section V, Emerging Technologies. 
(5) Central Command Remoting System (CCRS) Upgrade 
This project replaces the current 1970s technology Central Command Remoting System 
(CCRS) located in the Morrell Operations Center (MOC) at CCAFS. The current system has 
vanishing spares and equipment failures have caused Range Red conditions for several 
missions. The Air Force is currently funding FY10 development and testing of a prototype 
system that includes Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS) flight code capability. The 
current CCRS does not have EFTS capability, which must be in place by 2015 to meet USAF 
requirements. This project will help fund the installation, testing, and operational acceptance of 
. the new CCRS system at the MOC and Cape 1 A and 1 B sites. 
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FIGURE 8: CAPE 1A AND CAPE 18 COMMAND SYSTEMS 
(6) Additional Projects 
Many other Range Safety project submissions are being evaluated and assessed as part of the 
overall RICS range architecture study. Some projects, such as the Autonomous Flight Safety 
System, metric tracking , Range Safety System Modernization, are large, long-term projects that 
require close coordination and collaboration with ongoing 000 and Air Force architecture 
studies. The RICS architecture study is a joint USAF/NASA team, and key 45 SW and SMC 
participants are providing the required coordination . 
c. Commercial Crew Development Planning Office (CCDPO) 
KSC Range Safety provided technical support to the Commercial Crew Development Planning 
Office (CCDPO) in 2010 by developing the Range Safety inputs for the Commercial Crew suite 
of requirements and standards documents. 
The requirements document will contain the technical, safety, and crew health and medical 
requirements that are mandatory for commercial provider's attempting to obtain a Crew 
Transportation System Certification to transport NASA crew and limited cargo to and from the 
International Space Station. The NASA Range Flight Safety Program (NPR 8715.5 Rev A) 
requirements are currently listed as part of these mandatory requirements. If the commercial 
crew missions are licensed by the FAA, then FAA Safety regulations will apply and NPR 8715.5 
will not. Thanks to the efforts of the Common Standards Working Group, any differences 
between the FAA regulations and NASA range safety requirements are minimal. NASA range 
safety would remain engaged as needed to support the CCDPO and coordinate with safety 
authorities regarding any FAA licensed activities. 
The standards document will contain descriptions of processes, standards, and specifications, 
as well as the criteria that will be used to evaluate the acceptability of the commercial provider's 
proposed processes, standards, and specifications. Portions of NPR 8715.5 Rev A and/or its 
referenced documents may be included in this standard. 
The NASA Range Safety Office will continue to support refinement of these documents and the 
associated range safety requirements for commercial crew as the program evolves in 2011 . 
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2. Current Operations (Eastern and Western Range) 
NASAIKSC Range Safety supported 12 launches this year. All launches were from the Eastern 
Range (1 NASA-sponsored expendable launch vehicle, 7 non-NASA launches in the 45th 
Space Wing Risk Assessment Center, and 4 Shuttle launches). 
In order to ensure the requirements of NPR 8715.5 are met during pre-launch, launch, and post 
launch operations, NRS personnel worked side-by-side with our Department of Defense 
counterparts in the Eastern or Western Range Operations Control Centers. NRS personnel 
ensured any range safety-related activities that could have an impact on NASA launch criteria 
were communicated to the NASA Safety and Program decision makers to ensure safe flight and 
compliance with requirements identified in NASA Range Safety directives. 
We look forward to 2011 and supporting the numerous ELV launches at both the Eastern and 
Western Ranges. Additionally, we anticipate supporting three Shuttle missions. 
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Eastern and Western Range 
~~~~~ 
ISS 20A STS-130 KSC 02/08/10 NASA 
SDO Atlas V CCAFS 02/11/10 NASA 
GOES P Delta IV CCAFS 03/04/10 000 
ISS 19A STS-131 KSC 04/05/10 NASA 
OTV-1 Atlas V CCAFS 04/22/10 000 
ULF-4 STS-132 KSC 05/14/10 NASA 
GPS 2F-1 Delta IV CCAFS 5/27-28/10 000 
Dragon Falcon 9 CCAFS 06/04/10 Commercial 
AEHF-1 Atlas V CCAFS 08/24/10 000 
NROL-32 Delta IV CCAFS 11/18/10 000 
Dragon C1 Falcon 9 CCAFS 12/8/10 Commercial 
FIGURE 9: EASTERN AND WESTERN RANGE MISSIONS 2010 
3. Emerging Operations 
a. Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Policy Development 
Several Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operators have requested the use of KSC assets for 
their operations. Given NASA's plans to expand KSC business beyond launching and 
processing rockets, KSC Range Safety reexamined NASA's UAS policy and how UAS policy is 
implemented at KSC. This review began as a small internal effort within the KSC range safety 
community, focusing mainly on range safety-related requirements and processes. It has since 
expanded to include other key players at KSC as part of a joint effort to develop an overall 
Center process to evaluate and approve UAS projects wishing to conduct operations at KSC. 
This effort is still underway and has culminated in the chartering of a KSC Aviation Working 
Group (KAWG). The KAWG will , among other duties, develop a process for evaluating and 
approving all newly proposed aviation activities at KSC 
b. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Predator 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection , currently 
operates a Predator B unmanned aircraft system (UAS) out of the Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station (CCAFS) Skid Strip. KSC was approached by DHS with a proposal to use the Shuttle 
Landing Facility (SLF) as a possible backup landing location, and due to the lack of a safe 
hangar at the Skid Strip, a request to use the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Hangar as a 
possible storage location for the Predator in the event of a hurricane evacuation. The RLV 
Hangar would provide adequate protection for the UAS and its associated Ground Control 
Station during hurricane conditions and make available the use of the Predator for FEMA, if 
needed, during hurricane recovery operations. 
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To evaluate the DHS proposal, KSC Range Safety reviewed the data for the UAS and the pre-
coordinated route that the vehicle would fly during its landing and takeoff from the KSC SLF. KSC 
Range Safety ensured that the vehicle would not overfly areas with high population density or high 
priority facilities. Based on the findings of KSC Range Safety and the Center-wide team assigned to 
review the request, the use of the SLF and RLV hangar by the DHS Predator was approved by the 
KSC Center Director for use in the event of a hurricane. 
FIGURE 10. PREDATOR B GUARDIAN 
c. E-Green 
E-Green Technologies has developed an engine-propelled, manned airship designed to break 
high altitude and endurance world records. The airship will mark the introduction and first use of 
E-Green's Algae-Diesel fuel. E-Green Technologies is currently discussing with KSC the 
potential for using KSC facilities to conduct airship operations. Initial negotiations led to the 
decision to allow E-Green's demonstration flights for FAA certification to be conducted at Ames 
Research Center, pending their completion of the Ames Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review 
Board (AFSRB) process. After obtaining FAA certification, the airship will be transported to 
KSC to conduct their proposed flight operations. KSC Range Safety has remained involved 
throughout the planning process. The level of future Range Safety involvement will vary 
depending on E-Green Technologies' ability to obtain FAA certification, their operations plan, 
and the specific flights proposed at KSC. 
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FIGURE 11: E-GREEN AIRSHIP 
d. Global Hawk 
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) Global Hawks supported two successful earth 
science campaigns this year, Global Hawk Pacific, GloPac 2010, and Genesis and Rapid 
Intensification Processes, GRIP 2010 (see DFRC article for more details) . For the GRIP missions 
flown over the Atlantic Ocean, DFRC requested the use of the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) 
as an Emergency Divert Airfield in the event that a situation arose during one of the missions 
making it unwise and/or unsafe to fly the UAS back to Dryden at Edwards AFB, CA. 
To evaluate this request, KSC Range Safety worked with NASA Dryden Range Safety to 
conduct a risk analysis for flights of the Global Hawk into the KSC SLF. KSC provided flight 
path assumptions, population densities and facility information ; and reviewed the analysis 
performed by DFRC. The results of the analysis showed that all risks were well below the 
allowed requirements from NPR 8715.5 and were acceptable. These results were also 
coordinated with the 45th Space Wing Range Safety office which controls the restricted 
airspace around KSC and CCAFS. 
The use of the KSC SLF was approved as an emergency divert location by the KSC Center 
Director setting the stage for future involvement in UAS activities by KSC. 
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e. Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) Flight Test Vehicle 2 (FTV-2) 
KSC was approached last fall by the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) project team about 
conducting a flight test from the LC 39 complex area in the March 2013 timeframe. Initial 
conversations between the MLAS project, KSC Range Safety, and 45 SW Range Safety ensued 
with particular emphasis on determining if a Flight Termination System (FTS) would be needed 
for this second test. Since the MLAS project had successfully flown without an FTS at Wallops 
Flight Facility (WFF), the WFF FTV-1 flight test was examined in detail to identify similarities 
applicable to the proposed KSC flight test. 
The MLAS project began in 2007 when the NASA Associate Administrator for Exploration asked 
the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to develop and demonstrate an alternate 
Launch Abort System (LAS) as risk mitigation for the baseline Orion LAS. The MLAS project 
was subsequently undertaken with three goals: 
1. Identify the simplest LAS concept that will satisfy Orion launch abort requirements while 
maximizing nominal ascent performance. 
2. Design and deliver a Flight Test Article (FTA) in the shortest possible time. 
3. Conduct a flight test to gather data suitable for assessing FTA performance and validating 
design models and tools. 
FTV-1 was developed in response to these goals. Since the FTV-1 was an unguided vehicle, 
the WFF Flight Safety team determined that an FTS would not be needed so long as the flight 
hazards could be contained. By canting the launch vehicle platform from vertical , analysis 
showed that all hazards could be contained and that no FTS was needed. Figure 12, below, 
shows a depiction of a vertical and canted platform. 
FIGURE 12: FTV-1 ON A VERTICAL AND A CANTED LAUNCH PLATFORM 
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FIGURE 13: FTV-1 FLIGHT TEST 
MLAS met its goals and objectives with a successful flight test on 8 July 2009. The video can 
be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5xEshwVHnMY&feature=related . 
One of the first questions to be asked and answered with any proposed flight project is whether 
an FTS will be needed. In this case, the previous analysis performed by WFF does not 
translate well to the proposed test as there are major differences in the test goals and 
objectives. The primary differences causing concern are that the flight test vehicle proposed for 
test flight at KSC will be guided, and the project proposes to conduct a high fidelity pad-abort 
test which requires a vertical launch from one of the LC 39 launch pads. 
KSC Range Safety will work closely with the MLAS Project and the 45 SW to determine the FTS 
requirements . 
30 
C. Wallops Flight Facility 
Wallops Flight Facility's (WFF) mission is to be a national resource for enabling low-cost 
aerospace-based science and technology research. WFF is NASA's primary facility for 
implementation of suborbital science research programs, including sounding rockets, balloons, 
and airborne science. Wallops also builds small spacecraft systems, develops advanced 
technologies, conducts Earth Science research, and provides mission operations via the 
Wallops Launch and Mobile Ranges, Research Airport, and Orbital Tracking Station. Wallops 
activities annually support each of NASA's Mission Directorates and a wide array of U.S. 
Department of Defense (000) research and development (R&D) and training missions, 
including target and missile launches and aircraft development. 
A growing percentage of WFF business comes from the private sector. Wallops provides 
launch support for the emerging commercial launch industry, either directly or through the Mid-
Atlantic Regional Spaceport. Wallops also supports numerous aircraft companies that utilize 
the Research Airport for activities such as water ingestion testing. 
The Wallops Safety Office (Code 803) supports all missions at Wallops and at various other 
locations around the world as needed. This support includes ground safety and flight safety 
analysis, documentation of operational rules, and active support of ground processing and flight 
operations. Below are highlights of Wallops missions that the Safety Office supported in 2010. 
1. Balloon Program Office 
The Balloon Program Office at Wallops Flight Facility conducted 11 missions during 2010. 
Flight operations were conducted from Fort Sumner, New Mexico, McMurdo, Antarctica, and 
Alice Springs, Australia in support of Space science payloads as well as a test flight for a new 
balloon design. During the launch attempt of the Nuclear Compton Telescope (NCT) on 28 April 
2010 from Alice Springs, the mission suffered a high-visibility mishap, damaged the payload, 
and posed a grave threat to public safety. In response to the mishap, the program is 
undertaking corrective actions to make the balloon program a safer, more effective program in 
the future. 
During 2010, flight durations ranged from 4 hours to 37 days, with the longest flight occurring 
over Antarctica for the Cosmic Ray Energetics and Mass (CREAM) mission. The Balloon 
Program Office continued development of the Super Pressure Balloon. The balloon is being 
developed to provide ultralong duration flights, upwards of 60-100 days, at constant float 
altitudes. Plans for 2011 call for a test flight of the 14 million cubic foot Super Pressure Balloon 
from Antarctica. 
The Balloon Program plans to conduct remote campaigns in 2011 from McMurdo, Antarctica; 
Alice Springs, Australia; Kiruna, Sweden; and Fort Sumner, New Mexico. 
31 
FIGURE 14: CREAM 
2. WFF Aircraft Office 
The WFF Aircraft Office conducted multiple Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) flights during 
2010. Vehicles flown included Aerosonde, Viking 300lTigershark, and Magpie. These missions 
were a combination of NASA, 000, and commercial flights. One such flight was in response to 
a Blanket Purchase Agreement between the company L-3/BAI Unmanned Systems and NASA 
for a UAV Technology Project. 
FIGURE 15: VIKING 300 
3. Sounding Rocket Program 
The WFF Sounding Rockets Program (SRP) conducted 18 missions in 2010, including the first 
flight of the newly designed Nihka upper stage rocket motor and the first flight of the new Terrier 
Improved Malamute launch vehicle. The launch manifest consisted of four technology 
development/demonstration missions, one undergraduate student outreach mission, nine 
science missions (including space physics investigations and satellite under-flight calibrations, 
among others), and four reimbursable missions for the Department of Defense. Launch sites 
included Wallops Island (five launches), Poker Flat Research Range (two launches), White 
Sands Missile Range (seven launches), and San Nicholas Island (four launches). The 
Sounding Rockets program achieved an overall mission success rate of 94% for the missions 
launched in 2010 with only one mission not achieving its stated mission success criteria. 
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FIGURE 16: TERRIER IMPROVED MALAMUTE 
One of the Sounding Rocket missions launched from Wallops was SubTECll1. SubTEClIl 's 
primary payload was a technology flight demonstration of NASA's Autonomous Flight Safety 
System (AFSS). This is an onboard system that, when operational, can enhance the function of 
the human ground command flight termination system. In the event of a deviance off the 
assigned flight path, the AFSS would send a destruct signal to the rocket, causing it to break 
apart in flight, keeping it from endangering public areas. This mission was the third in the series 
of AFSS flight demonstrations. SubTECl1i carried two additional payloads: a NASA package of 
seven sensors to observe the rocket's performance and a Federal Aviation Administration 
payload designed to inform aircraft and air traffic control systems of the in-flight location and 
velocity of launch vehicles that could post a collision hazard to aircraft. 
FIGURE 17: SUBTECIII 
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4. Earth Science Research Support 
During 2010, Wallops began implementation of a new initiative to develop and demonstrate 
technologies that improve the use of UAS and small satellites in support of Earth Science 
research. During 2010, Wallops personnel have developed both an engineering prototype of a 
"6U CubeSat" small satellite system with standardized and modular avionics spacecraft systems 
supporting scientific instruments. Wallops also developed similar flight hardware for a UAS 
instrument support suite that shared a compatible architecture with the CubeSat project in order 
to enable the potential for a common instrument to fly on either carrier with minimal changes to 
the instrument interfaces. The UAS system was built, tested, and flown with the CloudSat 
instrument suite on a Viking 300 UAS in four series of flight tests which were completed in 
September 2010. WFF Safety played an integral role in the approval of the flight system and 
supported the UAS flight operations. 
FIGURE 18: SMALLSAT/UAS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROJECT 
5. Launch Support 
Wallops Range Safety personnel are supporting two Minotaur 4 launches in 2011 from Kodiak 
Alaska. In addition to flight safety risk analysis and certification of the Flight Termination 
System, Wallops will provide on-console launch support, including taking flight termination 
action , if necessary. Wallops personnel attended training in Cocoa Beach, Florida on the 
Range Safety and Telemetry System (RSTS) which provides redundant telemetry data sources, 
redundant command uplink for flight termination, and redundant computer systems with displays 
for real-time position and health status for launches at the Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC). This 
mission is a first for Wallops in that no radar tracking sources will be used by the Safety team. 
Wallops is utilizing two independent GPS based data sources from the vehicle (certified jointly 
by Wallops and Vandenberg Flight Safety) to meet the requirements of the NASA Range Safety 
Program. 
6. Flight Facility Infrastructure Improvements 
Preparations are underway for substantial improvements to the WFF Launch Range 
infrastructure that will add the capabilities to support medium-class expendable launch vehicles. 
Construction of a new Horizontal Integration Facility, redevelopment of Launch Complex OA, 
establishment of new vehicle liquid fueling capabilities, and improvements to the existing 
Payload Processing Facility and hypergolic fueling facilities will be completed soon. These 
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facilities will initially accommodate the new Taurus II launch vehicle and support the NASA 
Commercial Orbital Transportation System (COTS) and Commercial Resupply of Station (CRS) 
programs. Vehicle testing began in late 2010 and initial launch is scheduled for mid-2011 . Nine 
Taurus II launches are already manifested. The WFF Safety Office has been heavily engaged 
in supporting the design and construction oversight of the new facilities , as well as in the vehicle 
review, testing, mission planning, and hazardous procedure approval for the upcoming 
COTS/CRS missions. 
Taurus II (Attist Rendition) 
FIGURE 19: TAURUS II (ARTIST RENDITION) 
DATE VEHICLE ACRONYM LOCATION RESULT 
10/13/2010 Viking 300 UAV Wallops Island , VA S 
10/7/2010 Viking 300 UAV Wallops Island, VA S 
9/21/2010 41.082 GT SubTEC III Sub-Orbital Technology Wallops Island, VA S 
Experiment (SubTECIII) 
9/29/2010 Viking 300 UAV Wallops Island , VA S 
9/10/2010 Viking 300 UAV Wallops Island , VA S 
8/23/2010 36.219 US Terrier Black Brant Rapid Acquisition Imaging White Sands Missile S 
Spectrograph Experiment Range, NM 
(RAISE) 
8/22/2010 Viking 300 UAV Wallops Island, VA S 
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8/20/2010 Viking 300 UAV Wallops Island, VA S 
8/412010 12.073 GT Black Brant X Wallops Island, VA S 
8/4/2010 Viking 300 UAV Wallops Island, VA S 
8/3/2010 Viking 300 UAV Wallops Island, VA S 
7/30/2010 36.213 NS Terrier MK70-Black Brant Solar Ultraviolet Measurement White Sands Missile S 
MK1 (MOD2) Investigation (SUMI) Range, NM 
7/11/2010 36.265 UG Terrier Black Brant Cosmic Infrared Background White Sands Missile S 
ExpeRiment (CIBER) Range, NM 
6/24/2010 41.088 UO Terrier-Improved Orion RockOn Wallops Island, VA S 
5/21/2010 36.270 UG Terrier Black Brant Diffuse Interstellar Cloud White Sands Missile *F 
Experiment (DICE) Range, NM 
5/3/2010 36.258 UE Terrier Black Brant White Sands Missile S 
Range, NM 
5/3/2010 36.248 DR Terrier Black Brant Missile Alternative Range San Nicholas Island S 
Target Instrument (MARTI) 
3/27/2010 12.067 GT Terrier MK-70 Improved Malamute Wallops Island, VA S 
2/15/2010 40.025 UE Black Brant XII Correlation of High Frequency Poker Flat Research S 
and Auroral Roar Range, AK 
Measurements (CHARM-2) 
2/12/2010 36.251 DR Terrier Black Brant Missile Alternative Range San Nicholas Island S 
Target Instrument (MARTI) 
2/9/2010 41.084 UE Terrier MK_70 Improved Orion Poker Flat Research S 
Range, AK 
2/4/2010 36.250 DR Terrier Black Brant Missile Alternative Range San Nicholas Island S 
Target Instrument (MARTI) 
1/10/2010 36.247 DR Terrier Black Brant Missile Alternative Range San Nicholas Island S 
Target Instrument (MARTI) 
FIGURE 20: WALLOPS MISSIONS 
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D. Dryden Flight Research Center 
The Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) located at Edwards Air Force Base, California, is 
NASA's primary installation for flight research and flight testing. Projects at Dryden over the 
past 64 years have led to major advancements in the design and capabilities of many civilian 
and military aircraft. In the past, DFRC has also conducted tests in support of the Agency's 
space programs. 
The Center supports operations of the Space Shuttle and development of future access-to-
space vehicles, conducts airborne science missions and flight operations, and develops piloted 
and uninhabited aircraft test beds for research and science missions. 
Range Safety operations at Dryden are managed by the Range Safety (RS) Office. The RS 
Office was established by the Dryden Center Director under an alliance agreement with the Air 
Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) to provide independent review and oversight of Range Safety 
issues. The RS Office supports the Center by providing trained Flight Termination System 
(FTS) engineers, Range Safety risk analysts, and Range Safety Officers to provide mission and 
project support for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Projects. The DFRC/AFFTC Range 
Safety Alliance allows both RS offices to work with each other on projects that the other office 
may not otherwise experience. 
1. Enhanced Flight Termination System 
The DFRC/AFFTC Range Safety Alliance has installed and certified for operation a fixed 
Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS) transmitter site. The EFTS transmitter site has 
been used successfully to support two current, flying UAS projects. Modifications are being 
planned to address the needs of upcoming flight projects. Dryden also continues to support 
flight projects with Inter-Range Instrumentation Group (IRIG) Flight Termination Receivers. 
2. Orion 
The Orion Project is an element of the Agency's Constellation Program. The Orion Project 
consists of the Crew Module (CM) and the Launch Abort System (LAS). Dryden conducted a 
flight test to demonstrate proper operations of the LAS and CM recovery systems in response to 
abort events initiated on the launch pad and during the initial ascent phase of flight. Pad Abort 1 
(PA-1) was successfully conducted at U.S. Army's White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New 
Mexico on 6 May 2010. All systems for steering, separation, stabilization, parachute 
deployment, and landing worked as planned. The PA-1 test involved the first American 
application of a human-rated, reverse flow rocket motor. 
Range Safety for PA-1 was a collaborative effort between the Dryden RS Office, various 
organizations at Johnson Space Center (JSC), and the WSMR Flight Safety Branch. The RS 
Office tailored NPR 8715.5, "Range Safety Program," for PA-1 and verified compliance. No 
waivers were written. The RS Office also reviewed range safety products supplied by the 
participating JSC organizations. 
JSC prepared range safety products including the errant LAS analysis, the flight dynamics 
Range Safety data package, and the probabilistic risk assessment report. The WSMR Flight 
Safety Branch provided final review and approval for Range Safety and provided real-time 
operational support for the launch. 
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FIGURE 21: PA-1 
The video can be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shKuaWHjLhA 
Dryden continues to support the testing of a wide range of UASs. The UASs that were flown 
with Dryden assistance include: 
3. Small UASs 
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) are in the model-type classification of flight vehicles. 
Dryden has established an area that offers sUAS projects a unique opportunity to conduct 
flights within the restricted airspace. Dryden has also established a streamlined flight approval 
process for sUASs that makes the airworthiness and safety review quicker and easier than 
38 
those performed for larger UASs. Using this process, Dryden has successfully supported many 
hours of operations on multiple platforms from different manufacturers. 
4. Blended Wing Body Low Speed Vehicle 
The Blended Wing Body (BWB) Low Speed Vehicle (LSV) UAS, also known as X-48B LSV 
Project, is a dynamically scaled version of the original concept vehicle. The X-48B LSV Project 
is a partnership between NASA, Boeing, USAF Research Laboratory, and Cranfield Aerospace. 
The primary goals of the test and research project are to study the flight and handling 
characteristics of the BWB design, match the vehicle's performance with engineering predictions 
based on computer and wind tunnel studies, develop and evaluate digital flight control 
algorithms, and assess the integration of the propulsion system to the airframe. The BWB 
testing will address several key goals of NASA's Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA) 
Project, namely noise reduction, emissions reduction, and improvement in fuel economy. 
Industry studies suggest that because of its efficient configuration, the BWB would consume 
20% less fuel than jetliners of today, while cruising at high subsonic speeds on flights of up to 
7,000 nautical miles. To date, the Project has conducted 86 successful flights, all with LSV #2 . 
The Project has reached a milestone by successfully completing Phase 1. After several more 
flights, LSV #2 will be modified to make the vehicle quieter. The modifications include reducing 
the number of engines from three to two, the installation of noise-shielding vertical fins, and the 
removal of the winglets. The designation for this new configuration is X-48C. First flight is 
expected to be in mid 2011 . 
5. NASA Global Hawk 
Dryden has acquired two former United States Air Force (USAF) Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTO) Global Hawk UASs. These pre-production Global Hawks 
were built by Northrop Grumman for the purpose of carrying reconnaissance payloads. The 
vehicles will begin a new life as a supplement to NASA's Science Mission Directorate by 
providing a high altitude, long endurance airborne science platform. The vehicle has an 11 ,000 
nautical mile range and 30+ hour endurance at altitudes above 60,000 feet MSL. To date, 
NASA Global Hawks have flown 9 successful flights with NASA 871 and 20 successful flights 
with NASA 872. NASA Global Hawks supported two successful earth science campaigns this 
year: Global Hawk Pacific (GloPac 2010) and Genesis and Rapid Intensification Processes 
(GRIP 2010). 
FIGURE 22: GLOBAL HAWK 
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The Range Safety Office supported flight planning and risk analysis tasks in support of FAA 
Certificate of Authorization (COA) applications as well as real-time operations support. 
6. Ikhana 
NASA's Ikhana UAS is a General Atomics Predator-B modified to support the conduct of Earth 
science missions for the Science Mission Directorate. The aircraft is designed to be 
disassembled and transported in a large shipping container aboard standard military transports. 
Ikhana has been registered with the FAA and given the tail number N870NA. 
The Range Safety Office has supported flight planning and risk analysis tasks in support of FAA 
Certificate of Authorization (COA) applications as well as real-time operations support. The 
vehicle has flown 21 flights this year. 
Dryden Flight Research Center Missions 2010 
02/02/10 X-48B LSV Flight # 73 Edwards AFB Success 
(Blended Wing 
Body) 
02/03/10 Ikhana Flight # 91; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
03/05/10 NASA Global Flight # 7; Functional Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (872) Check Flight 
03/11/10 Ikhana Flight # 93; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
03/11/10 NASA Global Flight # 8; Functional Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (872) Check Flight 
I 
04/02/10 NASA Global Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (872) 
04/07/10 Ikhana Flight # 95; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
04/07/10 NASA Global Flight # 10; GloPac Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (872) Flight #1 
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04/13/2010- NASA Global Flight # 11; GloPac Edwards AFB Success 
04/14/2010 Hawk (872) Flight #2 
04/23/2010- NASA Global Flight # 12; GloPac Edwards AFB Success 
04/24/2010 Hawk (872) Flight #3 
04/30/10 NASA Global Flight # 13; GloPac EdwardsAFB Early RTB 
Hawk (872) Flight #4 
05/17/10 Ikhana Flight # 96; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
OS/27/10 NASA Global Flight # 1; Checkout Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (871) Flight 
06/15/10 Ikhana Flight # 97; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
06/15/10 NASA Global Flight # 2; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (871) Proficiency Flight 
06/15/10 NASA Global Flight # 3; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (871) Proficiency Flight 
06/22/10 Ikhana Flight # 98; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
06/22/10 Ikhana Flight # 99; Pilot EdwardsAFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
06/22/10 NASA Global Flight # 4; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (871) Proficiency Flight 
06/22/10 NASA Global Flight # 5; Pilot Edwards AFB Success I 
I Hawk (871) Proficiency Flight 
06/29/10 NASA Global Flight # 6; Pilot EdwardsAFB Early RTB 
Hawk (871) Proficiency Flight 
06/30/10 Ikhana Flight # 100; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Training 
07/08/10 Ikhana Flight # 101; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Training 
07/08/10 Ikhana Flig ht # 102; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Training 
'08/05/10 Ikhana Flight # 103; Pilot Edwards AFB Success I 
Training 
08/12/10 Ikhana Flight # 104; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Training 
08/12/10 Ikhana Flight # 105; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Training 
08/15/10 NASA Global Flight # 14; GRIP Edwards AFB Success 
I Hawk (872) Functional Check Flight 
08/24/10 NASA Global Flight# 15; GRIP Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (872) Payload Test Flight 
08/26/10 Ikhana Flight # 106; Payload Edwards AFB Success 
Test Flight 
08/28/10 NASA Global Flight # 16; GRIP Flight Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (872) #1 
08/31/10 Ikhana Flight # 107; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Training 
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09/01/2010- NASA Global Flight # 17; GRIP Flight Edwards AFB Success 
09/02/2010 Hawk (872) #2 
09/02/10 Ikhana Flight # 108; Payload Edwards AFB Success 
Test Flight 
09/12/2010- NASA Global Flight # 18; GRIP Flight Edwards AFB Success 
09/13/2010 Hawk (872) #3 
09/16/2010- NASA Global Flight # 19; GRIP Flight Edwards AFB Success 
09/17/2010 Hawk (872) #4 
09/21/10 X-48B LSV Flight # 81 Edwards AFB Success 
09/23/2010- NASA Global Flight # 20; GRIP Flight Edwards AFB Success 
09/24/2010 Hawk (872) #5 
09/28/10 X-48B LSV Flight # 82 Edwards AFB Success 
09/29/10 X-48B LSV Flight # 83 Edwards AFB Success 
09/29/10 X-48B LSV Flight # 84 Edwards AFB Success 
09/30/10 Ikhana Flight # 109; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
10106/10 X-48B LSV Flight # 85 Edwards AFB Success 
10106/10 X-48B LSV Flight # 86 Edwards AFB Success 
10/13/10 Ikhana Flight # 110; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
10/13/10 NASA Global Flight # 7; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (871) Proficiency Flight 
10/13/10 NASA Global Flight # 8; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (871) Proficiency Flight 
10/21/10 NASA Global Flight # 9; Pilot Edwards AFB Success 
Hawk (871) Proficiency Flight 
FIGURE 23: 2010 DRYDEN MISSIONS 
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E. Johnson Space Center 
1. Constellation Range Safety Panel 
The Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP) manages launch range safety matters 
for Constellation Program vehicles, including specifying key interfaces with the Department of 
Defense (000) for launch range safety. This report summarizes the work conducted through 
the LCRSP and its chartered working groups. 
a. Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710 Requirements Tailoring 
With the assistance of the 45th Space Wing (45 SW) and several NASA Centers, a tailored 
version of AFSPCMAN 91-710 was compiled for the Ares-Orion vehicle configuration. This 
document accurately captured the latest developments of the range safety requirements for the 
Constellation Program. In its current state, the tailored document can serve as a baseline for 
any launch vehicle or program architecture that NASA chooses to adopt in the future. Open 
items and areas for future investigation were documented during the tailoring process, and the 
team was able to make considerable progress toward mapping the tailored requirements to 
specific tasks that are being executed by various organizations throughout the Agency. 
b. Ares I-X Post-Flight Data Report 
Led by the Ares I-X trajectory team at Langley Research Center (LaRC), an in-depth post-flight 
analysis and trajectory reconstruction process was completed for the Ares I-X test launch on 28 
October 2009. The post-flight and Best Estimated Trajectory (BET) data, methodology, and 
results were reviewed by the LCRSP and the product customer, the 45th Space Wing (45th 
SW). A thorough range safety post-flight data report was compiled by the team at LaRC and 
subsequently delivered to the Air Force. 
c. Range Safety and Ascent Abort Debris Risk Assessments 
In conjunction with the Constellation Integrated Aborts Team (CIAT), the LCRSP reviewed and 
coordinated numerous risk assessment activities related to the ascent debris environment for 
launch vehicle failure scenarios. To ensure proper coordination between the range safety and 
ascent abort communities, a two-day Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) was held at Marshall 
Space Flight Center (MSFC) in February 2010 to discuss the various debris risk assessment 
techniques, debris catalog development work, and Flight Termination System (FTS) 
architectures. At the conclusion of the TIM, the ascent abort and range safety communities 
came to an agreement on a strategy for merging and improving the existing debris catalog 
efforts while preserving the technical advantages of each unique methodology. 
The LCRSP team also addressed several concerns that were raised by the 45 SW regarding 
FTS sequencing and integrity. The LCRSP's current and future work in FTS sequencing and 
integrity will improve future FTS design solutions for Ares or any other future launch vehicle. 
d. Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) Flight Termination System (FTS) Determination 
Analysis 
In support of future Orion test flights where an active Launch Abort System (LAS) may be 
employed, the LCRSP has begun to identify key range safety requirements, deliverables, and 
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processes that will be evaluated to determine the risks associated with LAS malfunctions. The 
data inputs and corresponding risk assessment results will determine whether a FTS is 
warranted for the future test flights utilizing a LAS. A high-level strategy was developed to 
address each of the requirements specified in AFSPCMAN 91-710 for this unique vehicle 
component. Also, the need for additional requirements related to the LAS debris risk analysis 
were identified and discussed with the 45 SW. The plan forward was developed to be 
applicable to any launch vehicle configuration. 
2. Shuttle Range Safety Panel 
In 2010, the number of topics dealt with by the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel decreased 
due to the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle. At the time of this report, only three 
topics of consequence, described below, had been discussed. In addition, the Launch Collision 
Avoidance (COLA) Process which was discussed in the 2009 annual report is updated. 
a. Shuttle Limit Lines 
Although the Shuttle uses two solid rocket motors and Ares 1 uses a single motor, both vehicles 
use the same motors. When Ares 1-X Range Safety Analysis generated impact dispersions 
that were noticeably different than the Shuttle impact dispersions, there was some concern. 
Since impact dispersions are used to compute the destruct limit lines for Shuttle, and the impact 
dispersions generated for Ares 1-X were significantly different than what would be predicted 
based on Shuttle impact dispersions, identifying the cause of this difference was important to 
ensure the safe flight of the Shuttle. 
Investigation revealed that the differences were due to improvements in analysis techniques 
and computational methods since the Shuttle analysis was initially performed (-1980). 
However, even though the "improved" destruct lines were visibly different, the same analysis 
showed that no statistically significant improvement in safety would result from their 
incorporation for two reasons. First, destruct lines are a tertiary backup to the primary and 
secondary debris footprint impact predictors, so they are unlikely to be used. Second, the only 
limit line changes occurred in areas that can't be reached by any imaginable Shuttle trajectory. 
Given the substantial cost and negligible benefit of the change, the Range Safety Panel 
requested that the Shuttle limit lines not be changed since implementing the proposed changes 
would have required updating and recertifying the Day of Launch I-Load Update (DOLlLU) 
software, and this would be time consuming and expensive. 
45th Space Wing approved a waiver to their requirements effective for the life of the Shuttle 
Program based on an equivalent level of safety as provided by the existing limit lines (see 
Launch Safety Requirements Relief Request, 45-NASA-NASA-2010-02-03, dated 2 March 
2010). 
b. Solid Rocket Booster Linear Shaped Charge Vibration Qualification 
The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) used modern instrumentation, analysis techniques, 
and computational resources to develop new vibration acceptance testing environments for the 
five-segment solid rocket motor intended to be used for the Ares-1 booster. These new 
environments were found to exceed the environments used for acceptance testing of all prior 
four-segment Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) in certain frequencies and locations. 
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MSFC prudently decided to use the new environments to re-analyze the Shuttle SRB 
acceptance tests. The SRB acceptance tests proved to be adequate with the exception of the 
Range Safety System Linear Shaped Charge, which was only tested to 3 dB of margin versus 
the required 6 dB in the radial and longitudinal directions. This information came to light very 
close to the STS-131 launch. Because of the limited time available, the issue was worked 
directly between the SRB Project, KSC Range Safety, and the 45th Space Wing Range Safety 
technical experts. 
After careful review of the data, the technical experts judged existing Linear Shaped Charges to 
be safe for flight, stating: 
"Flight performance (130 missions, including STS-51 L) and post-flight inspection since STS-
1 demonstrate the integrity of the hardware following exposure to ascent, descent, and 
water impact environments. Additionally, qualification (8-foot drop and 40-foot drop) and off-
nominal standoff test provides additional assurance regarding the robustness of the 
hardware." 
The results of analysis and the recommendation of MSFC and the 45th Space Wing were 
documented in MSFC Memorandum MP92-038-10, which was transmitted to all SSP Range 
Safety Panel representatives. The participants were polled, and all members concurred with the 
recommendations contained in the memo. 
c. FOV1 Software Version 2.5 
In the second half of the year, the 45th Space Wing intended to upgrade the version 2.4 FOV1 
(Flight Operations Version 1) software to version 2.5 in order to remove software modules 
required for hardware which had long since been removed. This would improve the speed of 
certain file transfers and would reduce the number of false failure alarms. 
In the normal course of events, discussion regarding the new version of FOV1 would not have 
come to the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel, since it would have been used first for a Delta 
IV launch, then briefed at the STS-133 Flight Readiness Review, and finally used for all of the 
STS-133 prelaunch checks prior to the STS-133 launch. However, about one month prior to 
STS-133, the Delta IV launch slipped to a date occurring after the STS-133 launch. 
Normally, the 45th Space Wing uses a new FOV1 version on an ELV launch before it is used for 
a Space Shuttle launch. The slip of the Delta IV left the Wing with a choice to follow the 
standard process by reverting to version 2.4, or to go ahead and have the first flight use of 
version 2.5 on STS-133. After careful consideration, the Wing elected to recommend 
proceeding with the first use of version 2.5 on STS-133. This decision was based on the size 
and nature of the software change, the amount and success of testing already performed, and 
the fact that installed and tested hardware would have to be reconfigured in order to revert to 
version 2.4. The 45th Space Wing requested the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel review 
their decision and recommendation. 
Because the issue was only of interest to a part of the normal SSP Range Safety Panel 
participants, a splinter telecon was held to present the 45th Space Wing recommendation. 
Johnson Space Center participation included representatives of the Flight Director Office, Flight 
Dynamics Division, Ground Control Office, and Navigation. Representatives of the Spaceflight 
Meteorological Group and the DOLILU Working Group declined to participate after determining 
that they were not impacted. 
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The 45th Space Wing presentation was well received, and the only reservations expressed 
were from the Navigation organization who felt that an end-to-end test with their systems was 
required prior to STS-133. Fortunately, the 45th Space Wing was able to incorporate the use of 
the 2.5 version of the FOV1 software into a previously scheduled Navigation test, allowing the 
requested end-to-end test to be completed in a very timely fashion. After reviewing the results 
of the test, Navigation was satisfied that there would be no impact to the use of FOV1 version 
2.5 during the STS-133 launch, and Range Safety Panel concurred with the 45th Space Wing's 
recommendation. 
The STS-133 launch was subsequently delayed until after the Delta IV launch, and this work 
around was not required. However, the process implemented above is indicative of the 
responsiveness and can-do attitude of the 45th Space Wing and the SSP Range Safety Panel. 
d. Launch Collision Avoidance (COLA) Process 
As a follow up to the 2009 Space Shuttle Range Safety report, 2010 began with the Air Force 
intending to implement their new Launch Collision Avoidance process for STS-130 and 
considering the Space Shuttle Program request for an 8 x 30 x 30 km screening volume. The 
Air Force did grant that request (8 x 30 x 30 km screening volume), but for various reasons, the 
new process was not fully implemented for any of the Space Shuttle launches through STS-132. 
At the time of this writing, the process is scheduled to be first used for STS-133. 
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F. Ames Research Center 
Ames Research Center (ARC) has established ranges at Moffett Field, Crows Landing, and San 
Bernabe Vineyard for the flight testing of NASA, university, and private company Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) operating as public aircraft under FAA Certificates of Waiver or 
Authorization (COA). UAS operations also take place in the restricted airspace of Camp 
Roberts McMillan Airfield and Fort Hunter Liggett Garrison. Other domestic and international 
sites are selected to support specific program objectives. 
ARC operates or oversees the operation of a variety of UAS for earth science missions, flight 
controls research and technology demonstration. The largest ARC UAS is the Science 
Instrumentation Evaluation Remote Research Aircraft (SIERRA), which has a wingspan of 20 
feet and a takeoff gross weight of 370 pounds with a payload capacity up to 100 pounds. The 
endurance is over 10 hours at a cruise speed of 55 knots. Recent missions have included the 
Characterization of Arctic Sea Ice Experiment (CASIE) deployment to Svalbard, Norway and 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging of test sites at Fort Hunter Liggett in support of NASA's 
Soil Moisture Active-Passive (SMAP) mission. 
Operations typically involve the participation of an independent Designated Range Safety 
Officer (DRSO) who oversees the range and ground safety aspects of the flight testing. The 
DRSO verifies the airspace is clear of obstacles, coordinates the use of visual observers, 
and verifies that the flight commit criteria are met. The DRSO ensures compliance with NPR 
8715.5 and with the provisions of the FAA COA and has the authority to order activation of the 
Contingency Management System (CMS) or Flight Termination System (FTS) to keep the UAS 
in the authorized flight area. 
SIERRA UAS 
---- --
FIGURE 24: TACSAT-3 
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G. Langley Research Center 
In October 2009, LaRC added a full time Range Safety Officer (RSO) in response to the 
increasing need for programs and projects to fly Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) 
weighing less than 100 pounds supported by various labs at Langley Research Center (LaRC). 
Figure 25 shows the relationship between the Safety and Mission Assurance Office and the 
Research Services Directorate where the Range Safety Program and the Range Safety Officer 
reside within the LaRC Safety Organization. These roles and responsibilities include 
independent oversight for all UAS operations at LaRC or LaRC UAS that are flown in the 
National Air Space (NAS) or at any government facility utilizing restricted air space. 
Langley Office of the HQ Office of Safe ty& 
Director Mission Assuran ce 
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Research Service 
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- Les Kegey , Aviation Safety Manager 
- Noel West, Risk Analayst 
- Jeff Hill, Range Safety Officer 
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FIGURE 25: LARC SAFETY ORGANIZATION 
During 2010, LaRC Range Safety provided oversight for sUAS flight operations in National 
Airspace and Restricted Airspace. LaRC Range Safety continued to work closely with the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Program Office and 
with the organizations managing Restricted Air Space. The primary goals of this effort were to 
maintain safety of flight for the public, public property, and test personnel and to ensure that 
NASA Range Safety requirements were in alignment with NPR 8715.5, "NASA Range Flight 
Safety Program ." 
LaRC currently maintains Certificates of Authorization (COAs) to fly in the National Air Space at 
Blackstone Army Airfield / Allen C. Perkinson Airport (BKT) and at Aberdeen Field Airport 
(31VA), Smithfield, Virginia. Operations in Restricted Airspace include Finnegan Field at Fort 
A.P. Hill, near Bowling Green, Virginia; Wallops Flight Facility on Wallops Island, Virginia; and at 
the Naval Outlying Field, Webster Field, Maryland. A total of 84 deployment days were logged 
across these facilities that included requirements for UAS pilot flight training / proficiency and for 
programmatic experimental flight research support. 
1. Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) Project 
The Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) project completed all its phase IV 
major milestones via deployments to Blackstone Army Airfield / Allen C. Perkinson Airport, 
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Blackstone, Virginia. The project is funded by the Aviation Safety Program and focuses on 
research flight testing of various flight control algorithms developed by NASA, industry, and 
academia for monitoring the health of vehicle flight control systems, the study of flight control 
system failures, and control recovery in commercial aircraft. 
The AirSTAR sUAS consists of a Mobile Operations Station (MOS) and a dynamically scaled, 
fully instrumented 5.5 percent scale Generic Transport Model (GTM) (shown in Figure 26). The 
current Concept of Operation (CONOPS) is to fly within the visual line of sight of an external 
safety pilot (EP) who monitors nominal flight conditions as research flight tests are performed by 
an internal research pilot (IP) stationed inside the MOS. If an off-nominal event should occur, 
the external safety pilot, pilot in command, has full authority to take control and safely land the 
vehicle. A Range Safety Officer (RSO) resides within the AirSTAR project team to monitor the 
safety of the flight operations and ensure compliance with the safety requirements of the Fort 
Pickett Range Safety Organization. 
FIGURE 26: AirSTAR MOS, TEST TEAM, AND GENERIC TEST VEHICLES 
2. SUAVELab 
The Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Laboratory (SUAVELab) provides low-cost, experimental 
test platforms for an array of various NASA, 000, and industry-funded projects. The laboratory 
has the capability to design, develop, and deliver prototypes of state-of-the-art UAS system 
solutions to projects of critical and/or national importance. Deployments to Fort A. P. Hill, 
Virginia were focused on maintaining pilot training and proficiency requirements along with 
project flight tests associated with the development of a Long Endurance Electric sUAS platform 
(shown in Figure 27) . This platform is intended for use in test verification and validation of 
customer requirements to develop state-of-the-art fuel cell technologies. The flight test team 
interfaced daily with the Fort A. P. Hill Range Safety Office as part of the required operation 
procedures and safety guidelines. 
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FIGURE 27: LONG ENDURANCE ELECTRIC SUAS PLATFORM 
3. FLiC 
The Flying Controls Testbed (FLiC) lab provides low-cost sUAS for experimental flight control 
testing like those shown in Figure 28. The flight campaigns include evaluation of various 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) UAS autopilot systems with the capability to operate in either 
manual or the full autonomous flight modes of operation. The experimental flight controller 
capability can be tailored to include auto takeoff, auto landing, and variable waypoint mission 
profiles along with lost link return home preprogrammed commands. 
The flight operations took place at the Naval Outlying Field, Webster Field, Maryland, and 
included pilot training and proficiency in both manual and autonomous flight modes as well as 
specific experimental flight control campaigns. Safety of flight and airspace management was 
conducted through the interface of the Navy Range Safety Office and NASA flight operation. 
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FIGURE 28: JET POWERED (JFUC) AND INTERNAL COMBUSTION POWERED (FUC), 
FLYING CONTROL TEST BEDS WITH GROUND CONTROL STATION IN BACKGROUND 
4. Rapid Evaluation Concept (REC) 
In-flight airframe damage assessment and mitigation techniques are vital to survivability of 
modern and future aircrafts. Engineers, under the auspices of the Integrated Vehicle Health 
Management (IVHM) Project, are researching techniques for diagnosing airframe state and 
applying mitigating measures in the presence of damage to aid in extending the life of the 
aircraft. 
The three questions driving this research are: 
• Can a sensor system be used to determine the location and extent of structural damage in a 
dynamic flight environment? 
• Can structure response be modeled using statistical and physics-based techniques with 
sufficient fidelity to perform damage diagnosis? 
• Can IVHM developed damage diagnosis technologies be incorporated into control 
parameter adjustments to mitigate further damage? 
To answer these questions, a low cost subscale aircraft sUAS (Figure 29) was instrumented to 
acquire structural load measurements at key points on the airframe. Structural loading data 
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were captured for flights of undamaged vehicles as well as vehicles subjected to certain fault 
injection scenarios, including weakening the wing spar tube. By measuring the loads in these 
cases, correlations can be made with other aircraft sensors to determine the state of the 
structure and mitigate further damage. Mitigating measures under consideration include 
augmented control mechanisms to shift load away from damaged components to help improve 
survivability. 
Initial flights with the undamaged spar were conducted in the NAS at Aberdeen Field Airport 
(31VA), Smithfield, Virginia. After thorough testing and evaluation of a weakened spar was 
conducted in the lab by the test team, a Flight Safety Release was granted by the NASA LaRC 
Airworthiness and Safety Review Board (ASRB) along with concurrence from the NASA LaRC 
RSO to conduct test flights in the restricted airspace at Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia. All flights were 
successfully completed and data analysis is being progressed for publication. 
FIGURE 29: RAPID EVALUATION CONCEPT (REC) OF A LOW COST INSTRUMENTED 
SUAS 
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H. Stennis Research Center 
Stennis Space Center contains 125,000 acres of "Buffer Zone" and 13,800 acres of "Fee Area." 
NASA owns the land in the Fee Area, and a combination of private and governmental agencies 
own the land in the Buffer Zone (see Figure 30). The Stennis International Airport (HSA) 
resides inside of the Buffer Zone along the Eastern boundary. The Department of the Navy 
(DoN) has purchased approximately 5,520 acres of land to the west of the Fee Area which is 
now considered the "Western Maneuvering Area" (WMA) . All occupants of the Buffer Zone 
must comply with the restrictive easement provisions established for the Buffer Zone . 
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FIGURE 30: JOHN C. STENNIS SPACE CENTER 
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As a result of the engine testing , the Buffer Zone at SSC has resulted in a Federal City capable 
of facilitating activities which require privacy and primacy. As such SSC has created a Range 
Safety Position within the Office of Safety & Mission Assurance and Katie Carr has joined the 
NASA Range Safety Team as the Range Safety Representative for SSC. The Range Safety 
Representative at Stennis Space Center plays an active role in securing the appropriate air 
space for the expanded, more aggressive engine test programs. In addition to the NASA 
mission, Ms Carr also assures the Tenets within the Federal City the greatest opportunities for 
mission success as outlined in the host tenant agreement. 
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1. Engine Testing 
Stennis Space Center is NASA's primary center for testing and certifying rocket propulsion 
elements and systems for the Human Space Flight Program. With more than three decades of 
experience in engine testing, SSC provides rocket test services to commercial and other 
government entities engaged in exploiting and exploring outer space. SSC has tested all Space 
Shuttle Main Engines (SSM E) as well as commercial engines like the RS68 rocket engine 
shown in Figure 31. 
FIGURE 31: RS68 ENGINE TEST AT NASA sse 8-1 TEST STAND 
The NASA SSC Engineering and Test Directorate maintains full-scale rocket test facilities . 
These facilities are comprised of two single-position large scale engine test stands, one dual-
position large scale engine and stage test stand, and the E-Complex for testing of both engines 
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and components. The Directorate also maintains engineering services capabilities including 
modeling and technology for propulsion testing applications. 
As a safety precaution to general aviation in the immediate airspace, Restricted Airspace R-
4403, is activated during engine testing. Between 1 January 2010 and 1 October 2010, R-4403 
was activated 18 times for RS68 engine testing. 
2. Small Arms Range 
The DoN has established a Naval Special Operations Forces for riverine and jungle training in 
the WMA. As of 22 March 2010, the DoN recognizes the Small Arms Range and the associated 
WMA training grounds to be in conformance with its certifications for specified weapons to be 
fired from boat, land, and helicopters. In accordance with DoN requirements, weapons and 
ammunitions are limited to: 
• 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm, and a .50 caliber Short Range Training Ammunition (SRTA) with a 
maximum range of 700 meters or less 
• Non-lethal ammo or "simunutions" 
• Blanks 
• Other weapons/ammunition as approved 
Currently, NASA SSC does not participate in the Small Arms Range Safety Program despite the 
fact that the Small Arms Range resides in the Fee Area. The DoN is responsible for all range 
safety, coordination, and monitoring as a result of the custodianship bestowed on the DoN by 
NASA via Memorandum of Agreement between NASA and the DoN dated June 2006. 
To augment the Small Arms Range training program, the Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NSW) has plans of expanding the Small Arms Range from its current foot print of 551,279 
square feet by adding an additional 1,311,300 square feet bringing the total range facility to 1.9 
million square feet. The Stennis Range trained 2803 personnel from February 2010 through 
September 2010. 
3. Special Forces IntegratedTraining 
As a result of the training opportunity the NSW and in particular Special Boat Team 22 (SBT22) 
has created at Stennis Space Center, other government agencies have approached NASA to 
enter into similar agreements. 
One such agency is the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). AFSOC conducts a 
unified training event annually which incorporates multiple locations and numerous agencies to 
first educate the AFSOC community and secondly certify them for war. Stennis Space Center 
has been chosen to participate in the 2011 Emerald Warrior exercise as a dry fire event. 
To prepare for this event, AFSOC and the NSW teams have conducted integrated training 
missions at Stennis Space Center to validate the feasibility of the activity. Understanding the 
restrictions and limitations which are inherent to Stennis Space Center is a corner stone to a 
successful exercise. 
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On 27 May 2010, an air-to-ground operation was successfully preformed. The Concept of 
Operations (CONOP) was provided to NASA SSC. NASA SSC routed the CONOP to the 
Aircraft Division at NASA Headquarters and other key NASA personnel for a risk assessment 
and safety evaluation prior to providing AFSOC with permission to proceed. 
4. Stennis International Airport 
Stennis International Airport (HSA) is located inside the buffer zone. Hancock County 
Development Commission is owner and operator of the facility and is responsible for all safety 
considerations at the airport. 
Total Aircraft Operations 175 per Day 
General Aviation - Local 25.2% 
General Aviation - Itinerant 64.4 % 
Military 10.2 % 
FIGURE 32: OPERATIONAL STATISTICS FOR 2008 - 2009 
5. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - Certificate of Authority 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) require a Certificate of Authority (COA) from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) for operation in the National Airspace. COA are available to 
public entities such as government agencies, local law enforcement, and state universities for 
research and development, market surveys, and crew training. Most COAs are issued for a 
specified time and require visual contact with the vehicle when operated outside of restricted 
airspace. 
Currently, the Department of Defense Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is the only 
operating agency of UASs at Stennis Space Center. The COAs for SOCOM are: 
• WASP, 2009-ESA-37, effective 22 March 10 to 21 March 11. 
• Raven, 2009-ESA-36, effective 21 July 10 to 20 July 11. 
• Puma, 2009-ESA-40, also effective 21 July 10 to 20 July 11. 
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v. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
A. Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) 
The long awaited second sounding rocket flight test of the Autonomous Flight Safety System 
(AFSS) took place on 21 September 2010 at Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) on a two-stage 
Terrier Improved Orion rocket. 
This was the third major flight test of AFSS. This flight included a Kalman-filtered Global 
Positioning System I Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) solution, redundant flight 
processors, separate AFSS battery power, improved safety algorithms, an ordnance simulator, 
and the Low-Cost Telemetry Transceiver (LCT2) in receive mode for the first time. Multiple 
flight rules were tested such as liftoff detection, over flight of exclusion zones and moving 
performance gates. 
All the flight rules performed as expected. The accelerometers in the IMU failed at T +20 sand 
the Kalman filter subsequently rejected this data and continued to produce a valid navigation 
solution using the GPS data-just as it should have done. The gyros were undamaged and 
continued to supply valid attitude data for the rest of the flight. The LCT2 did not receive 
commands until the payload was descending on the parachute. The reasons for both of these 
anomalies are under investigation. Otherwise, all the success criteria were met. The payload 
was retrieved undamaged. 
AFSS began the Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) process this year in conjunction 
with NASA's IV&V facility. The initial assessment is underway, and the final decision about 
continuing this effort to completion will be made early in 2011. 
FIGURE 33: AFSS FLIGHT TEST, 21 SEPTEMBER 2010 
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B. Joint Advanced Range Safety System (JARSS) 
The Joint Advanced Range Safety System (JARSS) began as a collaborative effort between 
Dryden Flight Research Center and the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base 
to develop a state-of-the-art mission planning, risk analysis, and government-owned risk 
management tool for range safety. In the past year, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) adopted 
JARSS to accomplish range safety risk analysis. Range Safety organizations from all Major 
Range and Test Facility Bases are being asked to support the development, testing, and 
operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), expendable launch vehicles (ELV), and 
reusable launch vehicles (RLV). The objective of JARSS is to provide range safety support for 
these types of missions. 
JARSS consists of two primary elements: a Mission Analysis Software Tool and the Real-Time 
Operations Tool. The JARSS Mission Analysis Software Tool is also known as JARSS Mission 
Planning (JARSS-MP). The Real-Time Operations Tool is known as JARSS-RT. 
The Mission Analysis Software Tool quantifies range safety risk for a given flight path and its 
associated vehicle parameters using a computerized method. This method streamlines range 
safety analysis by providing a consistent, high fidelity solution in less time than previously 
required by historical methods of analysis. Figure 34 presents an example probability of impact 
contour generated by JARSS-MP. 
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FIGURE 34: EXAMPLE PROBABILITY OF IMPACT CONTOURS 
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The Real-Time Operations Tool provides Range Safety Officers with near real-time assessment 
of the range safety risks during flight. This capability has many possible applications to the UAS 
or RL V operator such as: assessment of UAS overflight of populated areas, allowing extended 
flight of an anomalous vehicle, recovery of an off-nominal vehicle at an alternate landing site, or 
selection of an alternate flight or entry path. The JARSS-RT display for an example RLV re-
entry is shown in Figure 35 
FIGURE 35: JARSS-RT EXAMPLE RLV RE-ENTRY 
Major accomplishments this year include using JARSS Mission Planning to calculate range 
safety risk for on-site operations. Dryden Flight Research Center used JARSS-MP paired with 
KSC geography and population data to analyze the contingency landing of NASA's Global Hawk 
at KSC (see Figure 36). KSC Range Safety analyzed requests by the Department of Homeland 
Security, Customs and Border Protection, to perform both a weather divert of their Predator 
UAS to KSC's Shuttle Landing Facility and an orbit to altitude maneuver over KSC property (see 
Figure 37). KSC Range Safety also used JARSS-MP to estimate preliminary range safety risks 
for various UAS projects desiring to conduct operations on-site. The United States Air Force 
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) is working closely with Range Safety personnel from 
both Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) and Ronald Reagan Test Site (RTS) to modify JARSS-MP for 
use during Minotaur launches. 
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FIGURE 36: PACE-MP EXAMPLE GLOBAL HAWK APPROACH AND LANDING 
FIGURE 37: JARSS-MP EXAMPLE PREDATOR ORBIT UP AND EXIT CCAFS AIRSPACE 
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VI. SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS 
A. Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload Safety Program 
1. AFSPCMAN 91-71 O(T) 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload Safety Program is completing the ELV Payload 
Safety Program tailoring of the AFSPCMAN 91-710, which is a joint effort with the Air Force 
(30th Space Wing and 45th Space Wing) and applicable NASA Centers (JPL and GSFC). This 
tailored document, AFSPCMAN 91-710(T), infuses applicable NASA, industry, and Air Force 
Range Safety requirements into a single standard for NASA expendable launch vehicle payload 
projects. This methodology provides a single baseline requirements document that the Payload 
Project Office will tailor for Air Force and NASA acceptance and approval. AFSPCMAN 91-
710(T) should be completed by the start of 2011, at which point it will be turned into a NASA 
standard called "NASA ELV Payload Safety Requirements Standard (NASA-STD-8719.2X)." 
2. Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Pyrovalve Waiver 
The Program continues to analyze and assist the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Payload 
Safety Working Group (PSWG) and JPL in processing the MSL Pyrovalve Waiver. This waiver 
is necessary because the spacecraft is in violation of the EWR 127-1 requirements which state, 
"If a system failure may lead to a catastrophic hazard, the system shall have three inhibits," and, 
"A pressure system shall be dual fault tolerant if the failure of two components could result in a 
catastrophic hazard." 
The MSL Descent Stage Propulsion subsystem utilizes eight Pyrotechnic Isolation Valves 
(Pyrovalves) as flow control devices between the propellant tanks and the Mars Lander Engines 
(MLE). Because the MLE throttle valves are launched in the open position, each pyrovalve 
provides only single fault protection (two inhibits) against propellant (hydrazine) release and a 
potentially catastrophic exposure to personnel, critical hardware, and facilities. The use of 
single string pyrovalves does not provide the MSL DS MLE propulsion system with the required 
number of three mechanical inhibits against potential leakage of hydrazine as stipulated in the 
above requirements. 
JPL and ELV Payload Safety intend to establish the acceptability of the pyrovalves in their 
current configuration by obtaining this waiver. Rigorous qualification and acceptance testing 
has demonstrated that each valve has an internal flow barrier fabricated from a continuous, non-
welded parent metal. This is similar to tubing and other component housings. Given this, JPL 
considers the risk of leakage through this type of flow barrier to be non-credible. 
The ELV Payload Safety Program has obtained the assistance of the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC) to evaluate the reliability of parent metal pyrotechnic-operated valves 
(pyrovalves) in preventing leakage or uncommanded valve activation in payload propulsion 
systems that use hazardous commodities such as hydrazine or nitrogen tetroxide. The primary 
concern is the safety of personnel and resources during ground processing of NASA EL V 
payloads. The ELV Payload Safety Program is assisting with this analysiS and evaluation with 
the intent of using these results to create policy for all NASA payloads regarding pyrovalves 
within a spacecraft. 
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FIGURE 38: MSL POWERED DESCENT STAGE VIBRATION TESTING PHOTOS 
(PYROVALVES LOCATED IN DESCENT STAGE) 
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FIGURE 39: ILLUSTRATION OF PYROVALVE 
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3. ELV Payload Safety Program Training Course 
An EL V Payload Safety Program Training Course is being created to benefit all participants in 
the ELV Payload Safety community. It will be a computer-based training program available on 
NASA's SATERN database, making it easily accessible to all safety engineers and project 
managers, as well as any additional project engineers or personnel who will need to be familiar 
with the NASA Payload Safety Process. Currently, the NASA Safety Center has been 
contacted by the Program and is providing assistance. Additional video has been received by 
the NASA Press Site for the training course. This training course should be completed during 
the spring of 2011. 
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B. Falcon 9 Launches 
The first Falcon 9 rocket launched from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) on 4 June 
2010. Although the launch was initially aborted just prior to ignition due to a pressure glitch in 
one of the first stage engines, SpaceX engineers determined the problem wasn't serious and 
successfully launched 75 minutes later. Then, on December 8 2010, the SpaceX Falcon 9 
COTS Demonstration 1 was successfully launched from CCAFS carrying its Dragon spacecraft. 
Three hours later, Dragon splashed down in the Pacific Ocean on target. The Falcon booster is 
one of two commercial systems that will provide cargo services to the International Space 
Station as part of NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS). 
FIGURE 40: FALCON 9 LAUNCH FROM CCAFS 
Since KSC is the final decision authority regarding risk mitigation actions employed on KSC, 
KSC Range Safety reviewed the launch risk to the KSC population (employees and public) prior 
to launch, helped develop contingency mitigation plans, and were present in the 45th Space 
Wing Risk Assessment Center (RAC) during the launch to initiate any required mitigation 
actions. Although debris risks are generally contained on CCAFS property, hazards such as 
toxics and distant focusing overpressure (DFO) can pose potential risk on KSC property. When 
risk criteria are violated or a concern for a particular hazard is identified, the KSC Range Safety 
representative in the RAC reviews the risk and provides mitigation recommendations if required . 
The video can be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-ci9xlgNZM 
64 
c. Julier Uhlmann - Improvements to Statistical Techniques for 
Range Safety Analysis 
NASA Range Safety commissioned a special study to compare the Julier-Uhlmann (JU) 
transform, a nontraditional range safety technique to determine debris impact dispersion, with 
the commonly-used technique of performing Monte Carlo simulations. 
One limitation of the Monte Carlo analysis technique is the sheer number of runs required to 
develop a solution which truly converges. In the past, this method presented limitations to 
range safety organizations by requiring tradeoffs between fidelity of results versus the time 
required to obtain them. It is not uncommon to require tens of thousands of Monte Carlo runs to 
obtain a 5% error in impact variance and are typically not repeatable due to the random nature 
of the simulations results. 
The technical report resulting from this study provides an introduction to the JU transform, a 
historical perspective on the use of JU and Monte Carlo techniques, extensive verifications of 
the JU technique to include regression tests, and comparisons against NASA and third-party 
operational tools. 
The report highlights testing which shows that Monte Carlo approaches require 7,500 to 50,000 
times the computational effort of the JU technique when estimating the variance in impact 
dispersion within ±1 % for a six-degree of freedom drag integration to impact. Even if a much 
lower variance estimation accuracy of ±10% can be accepted, the speed advantage of the JU 
technique still ranges from 75 to 350 times faster. More concretely, when a JU approach was 
tested to replace the Monte Carlo technique used by traditional Shuttle risk analysis tools, the 
projected run time on a 22-CPU tower was reduced from 96 hours to 2 hours. 
Figure 41 summarizes the efficiency and accuracy of these techniques for the case of a 6-
degree-of-freedom drag integration to impact considering initial state uncertainty. The JU 
technique yields more accurate estimates at computational costs that are orders-of-magnitude 
lower. 
Method Integrations to Error in 
Impact Variance 
Standard Julier-Uhlmann 13 <1% 
One-Sided Julier-Uhlmann 7 <3% 
Latin-Hypercube Monte Carlo 1,000 -8.2% 
10,000 -2.5% 
100,000 -1% 
Simple Random Sampling Monte Carlo 1,000 -17% 
10,000 -5.1% 
100,000 -2.1% 
(est) 643,000 -1% 
FIGURE 41: EXAMPLE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE 
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In summary, the JU technique is widely applicable to problems within the range safety domain, 
and it provides accurate and repeatable answers in a fraction of the time of Monte Carlo 
methods. When operational timelines require much quicker assessments than traditionally 
allowed, the JU technique may be the only way to meet required levels of performance. 
The report detailing these findings is government-owned and is available upon request through 
the NASA Range Safety Manager. 
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SUMMARY 
Range Safety was involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events in 2010 
involving the development, implementation, and support of range safety policies and 
procedures. 
The completion of the latest revision of NPR 8715.5, "Range Flight Safety Program," in 2010 
was a significant achievement. Changes implemented included measures to incorporate 
lessons-learned, clarify the waiver process, and adopt emerging trends seen in the Range 
Safety community. Policy work also included launch support policy and agreements updates to 
the KCA-1305, "KSC/45 SW/SSP Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for Range Safety," and 
KCA-1308, "KSC/45 SW Joint Operating Procedure (JOP) for Safety," which were scheduled for 
triennial review. KCA-1305 was finalized on 14 September 2010, and KCA-1308 is expected to 
be approved early in CY2011. Progress was also made toward the anticipated 2011 completion 
of AFSPCMAN 91-710(T), a tailorable document combining applicable NASA, industry, and Air 
Force Range Safety requirements into a single standard for NASA expendable launch vehicle 
payload projects. 
Range Safety representatives took part in a number of panels and councils, including the Range 
Commanders Council Range Safety Group and its subgroups. NASA also participated in the 
Range Safety Group with Range Safety representatives from NASA HQ Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance, KSC, DFRC, and WFF actively supporting the Range Safety Group. 
Advancing our effort to provide training at various levels of Range Safety, NASA Range Safety 
has conducted over 40 training courses for NASA, 000, FAA, and contractor personnel. Over 
800 students have participated to date, with 588 students participating in 22 Range Safety 
Orientation courses. The NASA Safety Training Center is currently working to revamp the 
Range Flight Safety Analysis Course and is preparing to transfer the Range Safety Operations 
course to WFF in 2011. 
Range Safety also participated in the evaluation of several emerging technologies, including the 
Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) for expendable launch vehicles. The second 
sounding rocket flight test, which represents the third major flight test of the AFSS, was 
accomplished successfully during the last year. The Joint Advanced Range Safety System 
(JARSS) also continues to make progress toward achieving its goal of supporting Unmanned 
Aerial Systems and Reusable Launch Vehicles at all ranges. In the past year, Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) adopted JARSS to accomplish range safety risk analysis. 
We hope you found our web-based format for the Range Safety Annual Report to be usable and 
informative. As we move into 2011, we look forward to the opportunities and challenges of 
ensuring the safety of NASA activities and operations. 
Anyone having questions or wishing to have an article included in the 2011 Range Safety 
Annual Report should contact Alan Dumont, the NASA Range Safety Program Manager located 
at the Kennedy Space Center, or Michael Dook at NASA Headquarters. 
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